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CARPOOLING LIABILITY?:
APPLYING TORT LAW PRINCIPLES
TO THE JOINT EMERGENCE OF SELF-DRIVING
AUTOMOBILES AND TRANSPORTATION
NETWORK COMPANIES
Jacob D. Walpert*
Self-driving automobiles have emerged as the future of vehicular travel,
but this innovation is not developing in isolation. Simultaneously, the
popularity of transportation network companies functioning as ride-hailing
and ride-sharing services have altered traditional conceptions of personal
transportation. Technology companies, conventional automakers, and
start-up businesses each play significant roles in fundamentally
transforming transportation methods.
These transformations raise numerous liability questions. Specifically,
the emergence of self-driving vehicles and transportation network
companies create uncertainty for the application of tort law’s negligence
standard. This Note addresses technological innovations in vehicular
transportation and their accompanying legislative and regulatory
developments. Then, this Note discusses the implications for vicarious
liability for vehicle owners, duties of care for vehicle operators, and
corresponding insurance regimes. This Note also considers theoretical
justifications for tort concepts including enterprise liability. Accounting for
the inevitable uncertainty in applying tort law to new invention, this Note
proposes a strict and vicarious liability regime with corresponding no-fault
automobile insurance.
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INTRODUCTION
It is 2045, and New York residents have not personally driven
automobiles in over a decade. Moreover, few people privately own
automobiles. To commute to work in New York City, a suburban resident
uses her smartphone to hail a vehicle from a ride-sharing service.1 The
vehicle that arrives to transport her is fully autonomous, without the
components of traditional automobiles: no steering wheel, turn signal,
pedals, or mirrors.2 It is raining and dark in the early morning. During the
ride, she catches up on messages while her vehicle maintains proper speed,
obeys every traffic sign and signal, and otherwise drives like a reasonably
prudent person.3
The self-driving vehicle then arrives in Manhattan and awaits a right turn.
Simultaneously, a hurried pedestrian commuter crosses that same
intersection but does so negligently—outside of the crosswalk—in an
attempt to beat the light. The light turns green. Visibility is poor, and
because of the pedestrian’s rush, the vehicle’s artificial intelligence system
fails to read her movements properly and incorporate them into its complex

1. See Chris Martin & Joe Ryan, Super-Cheap Driverless Cabs to Kick Mass Transit to
the Curb, BLOOMBERG: TECH. (Oct. 24, 2016, 7:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2016-10-24/super-cheap-driverless-taxis-may-kick-mass-transit-to-the-curb
[https://perma.cc/A5KR-UWQK].
2. See infra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
3. See infra Part II.D (discussing the standard of care for drivers under traditional
negligence principles).
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driving calculations. The self-driving vehicle collides with the pedestrian,
severely injuring him. Litigation ensues.4
The benefits of self-driving-automobile and ride-sharing technology are
easy to conceptualize: increased safety,5 decreased energy costs, new uses
for commuting time, and greater mobility for those unable to drive.6
However, as these advantages continue to evolve, so too will the costs,
including diminished freedom and privacy and potential ambiguous
liability.7 From a legal perspective, emerging automobile technology
incorporates many interrelated issues in artificial intelligence, federal and
state regulation, legislation, tort liability, and insurance.8 To date, state
legislatures and the federal government have focused on regulatory issues
concerning metrics for safety, licensing, and testing, but they have failed to
address adequately questions of tort liability and insurance.9
Within the context of automobile accident liability, this Note considers
the significance of the combined emergence of ride-sharing services and
fully autonomous self-driving vehicles in reshaping the nature of private
vehicle ownership and driver control. Accordingly, it aims to answer the
following questions with far-reaching implications for courts and
statehouses:
What tort scheme is appropriate for this imminent
phenomenon? Is modern tort jurisprudence sufficient to guide judges who
will preside over accident litigation in the future? How should legislatures
faced with the proliferation of self-driving vehicles and ride-sharing alter
current law? The answers to these questions will be critical for automobile
and technology industry stakeholders, as well as individual vehicle owners
and drivers. Moreover, in considering socially optimal outcomes, liability
concerns may present significant deterrents to technological development,

4. Under current law, New York courts would likely hold that the pedestrian was
contributorily negligent but only a small percentage at fault for purposes of apportioning
liability. See Kane v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 2d 40, 51–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). In Kane, a
pedestrian commuter sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act when she was hit crossing a
New York City street by a U.S. Postal Service truck. Id. at 44, 52. The court held that the
truck driver failed to exercise reasonable care and was 90 percent at fault, while the
pedestrian failed to exercise reasonable care and was 10 percent at fault. Id. at 53.
5. See Mike Ramsey, Self-Driving Cars Could Cut Down on Accidents, Study Says,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 5, 2015, 12:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/self-driving-cars-couldcut-down-on-accidents-study-says-1425567905 (“[S]elf-driving vehicles could eliminate
90% of all auto accidents in the U.S., prevent up to $190 billion in damages and health-costs
annually and save thousands of lives . . . .”) [https://perma.cc/85G4-6CJP].
6. See Robert P. Denaro et al., Automated Vehicle Technology: Ten Research Areas to
Follow, TR NEWS, May–June 2014, at 19, 19.
7. See generally Jack Boeglin, Note, The Costs of Self-Driving Cars: Reconciling
Freedom and Privacy with Tort Liability in Autonomous Vehicle Regulation, 17 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 171 (2015) (providing a potential plan for regulators to reconcile freedom and privacy
with tort liability in autonomous vehicle regulations).
8. For more on these issues, see infra note 274. This Note incorporates regulatory
developments and newly enacted state laws but does not focus on regulatory challenges
associated with self-driving automobiles and transportation networking companies.
Moreover, distinct legal issues in artificial intelligence, see, e.g., Ryan Calo, Robotics and
the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513 (2015), are beyond the scope of this Note.
9. See infra Part I.C.
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even when they provide safety benefits in comparison to traditional
transportation methods.10
Self-driving technology is not an independent innovation; rather, it is
uniquely intertwined with changes created by transportation network
companies (TNCs).11 However, there is a lack of scholarship concerning
the interaction between these two interrelated transportation
Accordingly, this Note compares tort regimes to
advancements.12
determine what kind of accident liability system best accounts for the
changing nature of vehicle ownership and control implicated by the
combined emergence of these two transportation developments. This Note
provides a solution that considers three related concerns: (1) ideal societal
outcomes reflecting the costs and benefits of emerging technology and
sustained development, (2) careful application of existing liability regimes
to innovation, and (3) feasible answers for courts and legislatures.13 From
these concerns, this Note incorporates elements of enterprise liability to
propose a strict and vicarious liability system with no-fault automobile
insurance.14
This Note has three primary parts. Part I explains the emergence of selfdriving automobiles and discusses current technological and legal
developments. Further, Part I traces the technological evolution and
suggests ways in which that evolution may continue together with TNCs to
create a new transportation paradigm. Finally, Part I reviews legislative and
regulatory developments in response to self-driving vehicles and TNCs.
Part II explains tort law’s application to automobile accidents and theories
of recovery. Then, Part II identifies and compares various automobile
accident liability regimes in the United States, incorporating analysis of
motor vehicle statutes relating to vicarious liability for owners, driver
negligence, and insurance law alternatives. Focusing on the potential
consequences of new innovations for the application of tort law, Part III
analyzes previous scholarship and commentary on the legal questions that
the emergence of self-driving vehicles implicates. Lastly, Part III provides
a resolution suggesting important aspects of tort jurisprudence and statutory
insurance law that are best suited to self-driving automobiles with limited
private ownership created by ride-sharing.

10. See Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, The Coming Collision Between
Autonomous Vehicles and the Liability System, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1321, 1322 (2012)
(assessing legal liability as a potentially limiting consideration for manufacturers of
autonomous vehicles).
11. See infra Part I.A.2 (explaining transportation network companies and the increasing
popularity of their services).
12. See infra Part III.A.
13. See infra Part III.B.
14. See infra Part III.B.
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I. THE EMERGING PARADIGM:
PRESENT AND FUTURE VEHICULAR TRANSPORTATION
Over the past decade, self-driving technology has been gradually
introduced to the roadways. This part provides the foundation of selfdriving vehicle development necessary to understand reactions of
transportation stakeholders, legal responses to technological innovation, and
legal issues presented by these technologies. It then discusses modern
developments, including the efforts of traditional automakers and
technology enterprises and TNCs’ creation of a transportation model that
may lead to reductions in vehicle ownership. Finally, this part outlines the
legislative and regulatory responses to address self-driving vehicles and
legal issues that have arisen in the ride-sharing context.
A. Origins of Self-Driving Vehicles
Initially, the motivation to develop self-driving automobiles arose from
national security interests.15 The goal was to create unmanned vehicles for
the military.16 In 2004, the Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) challenged innovators to create self-driving
vehicles capable of driving across the Mojave Desert.17 No competitor
finished the 142-mile course; the top-scoring vehicle traveled less than 8
miles.18 Just three years later, DARPA conducted a competition with traffic
signals and obstacles in a simulated city, and six out of the eleven teams
successfully completed the test.19
The technology behind self-driving vehicles is highly advanced, but in its
simplest form, self-driving vehicles use detailed maps and sensor
information to determine their location and how to act.20 Sensors detect
objects around the vehicle and software classifies those objects based on
movement patterns, sizes, and shapes.21 The sophisticated software uses
predictive technology to project how objects around the vehicle will

15. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., The DARPA Grand Challenge: Ten Years
Later (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/DARPA/15-F-0059
_DOC_22_NEWS_GC_10_YRS_LATER.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BCD-P5A7]. This initial
motivation mirrors the original impetus for the Internet. See Barry M. Leiner et al., Brief
History of the Internet, INTERNET SOC’Y 2 (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.internetsociety.org/
sites/default/files/Brief_History_of_the_Internet.pdf [https://perma.cc/M58L-2B8Y].
16. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., supra note 15. (“The longer-term aim was to
accelerate development of [autonomous vehicles] that could ultimately substitute for men
and women in hazardous military operations, such as supply convoys.”).
17. See id.
18. See id. DARPA held another competition the next year, where five vehicles out of
195 teams completed the course. Id.
19. See id.
20. See generally Technology, WAYMO, https://waymo.com/tech/ (last visited Feb. 16,
2017) [https://perma.cc/P326-3XXD].
21. See id.
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move.22 Finally, the vehicle’s software chooses its course of action based
on its surroundings and relevant circumstances.23
Using an early version of this technology, the winner of the second
DARPA challenge was a Stanford University team led by Sebastian Thrun,
a Google engineer and coinventor of the company’s “Street View” mapping
service.24 Along with Google cofounder Larry Page, Thrun and his
engineering team were early promoters of self-driving vehicles’ potential to
lower energy costs and make highways safer.25 Accordingly, the
technology industry became a key participant in self-driving development.26
B. Modern Transportation Developments
A decade after the first DARPA challenge, transformative automobile
technology is becoming mainstream.27 Google was a pioneer in selfdriving vehicle development, but the company used Toyota and Audi
vehicles to test its autonomous technology.28 However, recognizing the
potential for industry upheaval as self-driving technology becomes the
norm,29 automakers have begun developing their own self-driving
vehicles.30
1. Traditional Automakers
Compete with Silicon Valley
Toyota, the world’s largest automaker, was slow to embrace self-driving
technology but has now significantly invested in robotics and artificial
22. See id. For example, the software might predict that a pedestrian standing at a
crosswalk is waiting to cross the street.
23. See id. Circumstances include, for example, road work, closed lanes, railroadcrossing indicators, and cyclists’ hand signals. Id.
24. See John Markoff, Google Cars Drive Themselves, in Traffic, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/science/10google.html [https://perma.cc/RT8E9SXV].
25. See id. (noting “Dr. Thrun sounds like an evangelist when he speaks of robot cars”
and the technology’s potential to “reduce fuel consumption” and “reduce[] [the] possibility
of accidents”).
26. See Ujjayini Bose, Note, The Black Box Solution to Autonomous Liability, 92 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1325, 1328 (2015) (describing how Google’s participation in the DARPA
challenges spurred its desire to develop self-driving vehicles for the public).
27. Ten years after the original challenge, DARPA noted that “defense and commercial
applications [for self-driving vehicles] are proliferating. The rapid evolution of the
technology [is] being driven by the information technology and automotive industries,
academic and research institutions, the Defense Department . . . and federal and state
transportation agencies.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., supra note 15.
28. See Bose, supra note 26, at 1329.
29. See Yoko Kubota, Behind Toyota’s Late Shift into Self-Driving Cars, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 12, 2016, 8:43 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/behind-toyotas-late-shift-into-selfdriving-cars-1452649436 (observing that “traditional car makers fear software makers will
steal the auto’s soul and profitability”) [https://perma.cc/F5YD-HWBV].
30. See Roberto Baldwin, Automakers Are Beating Silicon Valley at Its Own Game,
ENGADGET (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.engadget.com/2016/10/19/automakers-are-beatingsilicon-valley-at-its-own-game/ (arguing that traditional automakers are surpassing the
efforts of technology companies in producing self-driving vehicles) [https://perma.cc/6ZPRB34C].
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intelligence to make self-driving vehicles by 2020.31 Likewise, Volvo has
announced plans to offer optional $10,000 premium autopilot features that
permit users to disengage from driving completely, but the vehicle’s
steering wheel will continue to allow physical driving.32 While not a
traditional automaker, electric-car specialist Tesla offers limited autopilot in
some vehicles through autosteer, lane-departure warning, and emergency
braking safety features.33 However, drivers are required to keep their hands
on the wheel and prepare to take control when necessary.34 In October
2016, Tesla announced that it will equip all vehicles with hardware that
allows for eventual fully autonomous driving.35
Other automakers are developing the technology in alternative ways. For
example, Ford concentrates on taxi services, announcing its “intent to have
a high-volume, fully autonomous . . . vehicle in commercial operation in
2021 in a ride-hailing or ride-sharing service.”36 Ford expects these
vehicles to be entirely driverless, with no steering wheels or pedals.37
Similarly, Google—initially focused on software—plans to build selfdriving vehicles without steering wheels or pedals, designed to operate
without human intervention.38
31. See Kubota, supra note 29. Toyota’s President Akio Toyoda declared that he
“wouldn’t trust an autonomously operating vehicle until one could beat a human-driven car
around the Nürburgring racecourse in Germany.” Id. Fellow Japanese automaker Nissan
also hopes to offer fully autonomous vehicles by 2020. Id.
32. See Keith Naughton, Volvo Plans to Offer Fully Self-Driving Car to Luxury Buyers,
BLOOMBERG: TECH. (Sept. 29, 2016, 12:35 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2016-09-29/volvo-plans-to-offer-fully-self-driving-car-to-luxury-buyers [https://perma.cc/Q
WG3-88ZW].
33. See Kate Greene, Life in Google’s Self-Driving City, CONSUMER REP. (Sept. 6,
2016),
http://www.consumerreports.org/cars-life-in-googles-self-driving-city/
[https://
perma.cc/XN5R-8ZBM].
34. See Naughton, supra note 32. Tesla considers its self-driving capabilities to be level
2 autonomy, while others believe Tesla’s autopilot is level 3. See Jordan Golson, Volvo
Autonomous Car Engineer Calls Tesla’s Autopilot a ‘Wannabe,’ VERGE (Apr. 27, 2016, 4:45
PM), http://www.theverge.com/2016/4/27/11518826/volvo-tesla-autopilot-autonomous-selfdriving-car [https://perma.cc/LJ2R-FDWY]. For an explanation of autonomy levels, see
infra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
35. See Keith Laing, Tesla Again Scrambles the Self-Driving Debate, DET. NEWS (Oct.
27, 2016, 11:30 PM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/business/autos/2016/10/27/teslascrambles-self-driving-debate/92866300/ [https://perma.cc/BF66-VFLV].
36. Press Release, Ford Motor Co., Ford Targets Fully Autonomous Vehicle for Ride
Sharing in 2021; Invests in New Tech Companies, Doubles Silicon Valley Team (Aug. 16,
2016),
https://media.ford.com/content/fordmedia/fna/us/en/news/2016/08/16/ford-targetsfully-autonomous-vehicle-for-ride-sharing-in-2021.html [https://perma.cc/HB86-4MB5].
37. See Russ Mitchell, Ford Reveals Self-Driving Cars; Politeness May Be a Problem,
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2016, 4:20 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/autos/la-fi-hy-fordself-driving-20160913-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/BNX2-DGTC].
38. See Amy Levine, Can I Be Held Negligent If My Self-Driving Car Causes an
Accident?, INS. J. (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/features/
2015/04/20/364411.htm (“Unlike an airplane operating on autopilot mode, which still
requires the pilots to account for unanticipated objects in the sky and regain control of the
aircraft when necessary, the ‘operator’ of this model of self-driving car would not even have
the opportunity to intervene in the driving of the vehicle.”) [https://perma.cc/BJR6-5J2T].
Further, Google’s parent company spun off its autonomous vehicle project to operate as a
stand-alone business called Waymo, signaling confidence in the technology’s ability to be
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2. Participation of Transportation Network Companies
In Fall 2016, Uber, a TNC39 and the world’s most valuable start-up,40
began deploying self-driving vehicles in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.41
Several months later, Uber expanded its pilot program to Arizona42 after
encountering regulatory pushback when introducing the service in San
Francisco, California.43 Like Google, Uber wants to refine how self-driving
vehicles behave in real surroundings, which include interactions between
these vehicles and their passengers.44 Drivers’ natural behaviors and social
cues are critical because they contribute to subtle driving culture, which
varies by neighborhood, city, state, and region.45 Ultimately, Uber is
counting on fully autonomous vehicles to transform the economics of ridehailing by eliminating its largest cost: drivers.46
commercially viable rather than simply research-oriented. See Daisuke Wakabayashi,
Google Parent Company Spins Off Self-Driving Car Business, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/technology/google-parent-company-spins-off-waymoself-driving-car-business.html [https://perma.cc/9XY2-38NB].
39. TNCs are variously referred to as ride-sharing, ride-hailing, or ride-sourcing
services. A discussion of the specific distinctions between these terms and how they differ
from traditional taxi services is outside the scope of this Note. TNCs are nonetheless
highlighted because they reflect broader trends in vehicle ownership and thus have important
implications for liability. As first defined for regulation by the California Public Utilities
Commission, TNCs use online-enabled platforms to connect passengers with drivers using
their personal, noncommercial vehicles. Press Release, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, CPUC
Establishes Rules for Transportation Network Companies (Sept. 19, 2013),
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M077/K132/77132276.PDF
[https://perma.cc/WC4A-ZKVK]; see also Tomio Geron, California Becomes First State to
Regulate Ridesharing Services Lyft, Sidecar, UberX, FORBES (Sept. 19, 2013, 3:40 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/09/19/california-becomes-first-state-toregulate-ridesharing-services-lyft-sidecar-uberx [https://perma.cc/6GHZ-ZXG4].
40. See Alison Griswold, Uber’s Self-Driving Cars Are Already Getting into Scrapes on
the Streets of Pittsburgh, QUARTZ (Oct. 4, 2016), http://qz.com/798092/a-self-driving-ubercar-went-the-wrong-way-on-a-one-way-street-in-pittsburgh/ (stating that Uber has a $68
billion valuation) [https://perma.cc/5B79-PYDJ].
41. See Aarti Shahani, Uber to Roll Out Self-Driving Cars in Pittsburgh, NPR
(Aug. 20, 2016), https://ww2.kqed.org/news/2016/08/20/uber-to-roll-out-self-driving-cars-inpittsburgh/ [https://perma.cc/M6QZ-DU8U]. Weather is one reason that Uber has rolled out
its research in Pittsburgh; the city has four seasons, unlike the occasionally rainy Silicon
Valley. See Signe Brewster, Uber Starts Self-Driving Car Pickups in Pittsburgh,
TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 14, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/09/14/1386711/ [https://
perma.cc/H9T9-PF2A]. It is also an older city, with an irregular grid, bridges, and many
potholes. See id.
42. See Eric Newcomer & Ellen Huet, Uber Ships Self-Driving Cars to Arizona After
California Ban, BLOOMBERG: TECH (Dec. 22, 2016, 4:02 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2016-12-22/uber-pulls-self-driving-cars-from-california-for-arizona
(“The
California Department of Motor Vehicles banned Uber’s self-driving cars from San
Francisco . . . just days after they first deployed. In response, Uber picked up and moved [to
Arizona].”) [https://perma.cc/9BJT-5LUD].
43. See id.; see also Press Release, Uber, San Francisco, Your Self-Driving Uber Is
Arriving Now (Dec. 14, 2016), https://newsroom.uber.com/san-francisco-your-self-drivinguber-is-arriving-now/ [https://perma.cc/4M3U-KNQC].
44. See Brewster, supra note 41.
45. See Greene, supra note 33.
46. See Griswold, supra note 40. Uber lost over $1.2 billion in the first half of 2016,
mostly due to subsidies spent on drivers. See Eric Newcomer, Uber Loses at Least $1.2
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Uber envisions a world of transportation where its vehicles make the
required complex driving maneuvers while transporting passengers without
the need for drivers, thereby operating more efficiently.47 Accordingly, the
increased popularity and customer reliance on services provided by Uber
and its competitors, as well as vehicle-sharing services like Zipcar, have
become disruptive forces in the automotive industry at the same time as the
emergence of self-driving technology.48
As traditional automakers have begun to invest in self-driving vehicles,
so too have they recognized that the technology-driven future of
automobiles will involve transportation without car ownership.49 Thus,
Toyota has invested in Uber, and Volkswagen has invested in Gett, a
competitor popular in Europe.50 Additionally, BMW and Mercedes-Benz
have started to develop their own ride services.51 Likewise, Lyft—Uber’s
largest American competitor52—plans to transport customers in self-driving
vehicles within the next year through a partnership with General Motors.53
Lyft pledges that more than half of rides offered through their service will
be autonomous by 2021, but more significantly, the company proclaims that
“[b]y 2025, private car ownership will all-but end in major U.S. cities” due
to self-driving vehicles.54
3. Vehicle Ownership Trends
Although the claim is ambitious,55 the potential end to private vehicle
ownership is reflected in various trends. According to a 2014 study,
American households without a vehicle have increased nearly every year

Billion in First Half of 2016, BLOOMBERG: TECH (Aug. 25, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-25/uber-loses-at-least-1-2-billion-in-first-halfof-2016 [https://perma.cc/UA2T-3AGK].
47. See Mike Isaac, Uber Bets on Artificial Intelligence with Acquisition and New Lab,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/05/technology/uber-bets-onartificial-intelligence-with-acquisition-and-new-lab.html (reporting on Uber’s acquisition of
an artificial intelligence company and the importance that technology companies place on
artificial intelligence) [https://perma.cc/CK5V-KUX6].
48. See Mike Isaac & Neal E. Boudette, Automakers Befriend Start-Ups Like Uber,
Girding Against a Changing Car Culture, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/25/technology/uber-gett-ridesharing-toyota-vw.html
[https://perma.cc/B537-6G7R].
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. David Gelles & Mike Isaac, Lyft Is Said to Seek a Buyer, Without Success, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/20/technology/lyft-is-said-to-failto-find-a-buyer-despite-talks-with-several-companies.html [https://perma.cc/LS6N-7DDR].
53. See Isaac & Boudette, supra note 48 (noting that General Motors invested $500
million in Lyft).
54. See John Zimmer, The Third Transportation Revolution, MEDIUM (Sept. 18, 2016),
https://medium.com/@johnzimmer/the-third-transportation-revolution-27860f05fa91#.ibu0
c5dwh [https://perma.cc/2E5J-8VDQ].
55. See Victor Luckerson, Lyft’s 10-Year Driverless Car Plan Is a Pipe Dream, RINGER (Sept.
26, 2016), https://theringer.com/lyfts-10-year-driverless-car-plan-is-a-pipe-dream-6d6e87
f7c375#.oh7hmmgmt [https://perma.cc/KD63-6RGC].
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since 2007.56 Moreover, the proportion of households without a vehicle
increased in twenty-one of the thirty largest American cities.57 In a
subsequent study, the same institute found a continuous decrease in the
percentage of individuals under age forty-five with a license.58
Specifically, about 87 percent of nineteen-year-olds in 1983 held licenses,
but that figure dropped to 69 percent thirty years later.59
As the percentage of new vehicles sold to eighteen- to thirty-four-yearolds has dropped significantly, many argue that a slowed economy
dissuades younger people from investing in a car.60 However, evidence
shows that millennials’ “interests and priorities have been redefined in the
last two decades, pushing cars to the side while must-have personal
technology products take up the fast lane.”61 Accordingly, the combination
of younger generations’ distaste for automobile ownership, decreased desire
for licenses, preference for personal technology products, and widespread
use of smartphone applications have created a unique opportunity for TNCs
and self-driving vehicles.62

56. See Hitchin’ a Ride: Fewer Americans Have Their Own Vehicle, U. MICH. (Jan. 23,
2014), http://ns.umich.edu/new/releases/21923-hitchin-a-ride-fewer-americans-have-theirown-vehicle [https://perma.cc/Z7VJ-2N5Q].
57. See id.
58. See More Americans of All Ages Spurning Driver’s Licenses, U. MICH.
(Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.umtri.umich.edu/what-were-doing/news/more-americans-allages-spurning-drivers-licenses [https://perma.cc/LZ7T-CBBG].
59. See id. (“Other teen driving groups have also declined: 18-year-olds fell from 80
percent in 1983 to 60 percent in 2014, 17-year-olds decreased from 69 percent to 45 percent,
and 16-year-olds plummeted from 46 percent to 24 percent.”).
60. See Darren Ross, Millennials Don’t Care About Owning Cars, and Car Makers
Can’t Figure Out Why, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 26, 2014, 10:16 AM), https://
www.fastcoexist.com/3027876/millennials-dont-care-about-owning-cars-and-car-makerscant-figure-out-why [https://perma.cc/3R9B-M4XZ].
61. Id.
62. This generational shift may include future products like Lynk & Co’s vehicle, a
“smartphone on wheels” that is a “fully-connected digital car built for young people who live
in megacities.” See Máté Petrány, Lynk & Co Wants to Build a Car You’ll Love as Much as
Your Smartphone, ROAD & TRACK (Oct. 21, 2016), http://www.roadandtrack.com/newcars/future-cars/a31258/lynk-co-first-chinese-car-in-america-usa/ [https://perma.cc/T7V99ZHB]. The vehicle “is designed to perform a remarkable trick: Whenever you won’t be
driving it for a while, you can [share it]. Your vehicle’s availability is posted on a social
network . . . . For someone to borrow your car, they simply reserve it, walk up, and unlock
the vehicle with their phone using a Lynk & Co app.” See Mark Wilson, Hate Owning a
Car?: This New SUV Is Designed to Be Shared, FAST COMPANY (Oct. 19, 2016, 6:50 PM),
https://www.fastcodesign.com/3064786/hate-owning-a-car-this-new-suv-is-designed-to-beshared [https://perma.cc/CCT7-7TC6]; see also Markoff, supra note 24 (discussing the
prospect that self-driving technology will “allow the cars to be summoned electronically, so
that people could share them.”). Moreover, “[f]ewer cars would then be needed, reducing
the need for parking spaces, which consume valuable land.” Id. Thus, self-driving vehicle
lessees and owners will be able to rent their cars to others when they are not using them,
providing vehicles without traditional ownership burdens.
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C. Legislative and Regulatory Responses
In an industry with laws that date back to an era of horse-drawn
carriages,63 developments in engineering and technology are part of a
broader automotive ecosystem that requires detailed legislative and
regulatory schemes.
As these transformational shifts alter personal transportation, inevitably,
accidents occur that affect human lives. In fact, in February 2016, Google’s
self-driving project caused its first accident.64 Although Google’s vehicles
had previously been involved in collisions, this incident was the first time
the company’s software was likely at fault.65 Likewise, TNCs have been
involved in fatal accidents resulting in greater focus on liability and
Accordingly, states and the federal
insurance coverage issues.66
government have sought to address issues arising both from self-driving
vehicles and TNCs. Legislative and regulatory developments are relevant
to this Note because they implicate critical details about the variation
among states in tort liability and insurance plans.
1. Self-Driving Vehicles
As a result of lobbying by Google,67 in 2012, Nevada became the first
state to pass legislation and approve an autonomous vehicle license, thus

63. See John Markoff, Google Lobbies Nevada to Allow Self-Driving Cars, N.Y. TIMES
(May 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/11/science/11drive.html [https://
perma.cc/85KG-UZJD].
64. See Alex Davies, Google’s Self-Driving Car Caused Its First Crash, WIRED (Feb.
29, 2016, 2:04 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/02/googles-self-driving-car-may-causedfirst-crash/ (describing that the crash occurred when the self-driving vehicle changed lanes to
get around a storm drain’s sand-bagged perimeter and moved into the path of an approaching
bus) [https://perma.cc/D3M3-DL9Q].
65. See id. Other collisions occurred when human drivers rear-end self-driving vehicles.
Over the first six years of Google’s project, the company’s vehicles were involved in
fourteen minor accidents, including eleven rear-enders. See Charlie Osbourne, Google’s
Autonomous Car Injuries: Blame the Human, ZDNET (July 17, 2015, 7:27 PM),
http://www.zdnet.com/article/googles-autonomous-car-injuries-blame-the-human/ [https://
perma.cc/G5QW-KFZ9]. Later in 2016, a Tesla was involved in the first fatal accident
involving a self-driving vehicle, with the crash serving as a sign that the technology might
not be as advanced as proponents have suggested. See Bill Vlasic & Neal E. Boudette, SelfDriving Tesla Was Involved in Fatal Crash, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES
(June 30, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/01/business/self-driving-tesla-fatal-crashinvestigation.html [https://perma.cc/K5E6-NTWS]. The fatality occurred when a tractortrailer made a left turn in front of a Tesla, and the vehicle failed to apply the brakes despite
being in autopilot. Id. Tesla asserted that neither autopilot nor the driver noticed the tractortrailer’s white side against a bright sky, so brakes were not applied. Id.
66. See R.J. Lehmann, Blurred Lines: Insurance Challenges in the Ride-Sharing
Market, R STREET INST. 5 (Oct. 2014), http://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/
RSTREET28.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4NK-TQ36]. In 2014, Uber was sued by the father of a
six-year-old girl who died after being hit by an Uber driver, but Uber stated that the driver
was not providing services at the time. The lawsuit challenged TNCs’ “assertion that they
are not liable for accidents experienced by [their] drivers.” Id.
67. See Markoff, supra note 63. Although Google’s reason for focusing its initial
lobbying efforts on Nevada is unclear, it may be due to the state’s lower insurance costs. See
Bose, supra note 26, at 1330 n.36.
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allowing their legal operation on public roads.68 Several other jurisdictions
followed in the same year with legislation, including California,69 the
District of Columbia,70 and Florida.71 To date, thirty-four states have
considered legislation related to autonomous vehicles, with nine states and
the Washington, D.C., passing such legislation.72
State legislation continues to expand. Florida’s 2012 statute declared a
legislative intent to encourage the safe development, testing, and operation
of autonomous vehicle technology;73 the state’s 2016 legislation not only
expands the permissible operation of autonomous vehicles, but it eliminates
testing requirements and, significantly, the formerly mandated presence of a
driver.74
Pursuant to statutory authority, some state agencies have promulgated
regulations relating to self-driving vehicles.75 Nevada’s Department of
Motor Vehicles defines “autonomous vehicle,”76 establishes a distinct
driver’s license endorsement,77 and specifies operation, safety, testing, and
Other states’ regulations have defined
certification requirements.78
autonomous vehicles using similar language.79 Likewise, regulations
comparably define operators or drivers of autonomous vehicles, either as an
individual who “causes the autonomous vehicle to engage”80 or the “human
operator” of the autonomous vehicle.81 At the same time, state regulations

68. See Bose, supra note 26, at 1330; Mary Slosson, Google Gets First Self-Driven Car
License in Nevada, REUTERS (May 8, 2012, 6:39 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ukusa-nevada-google-idUSLNE84701320120508 [https://perma.cc/8RBG-J4JS].
69. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750 (West 2012) (amended 2015).
70. See D.C. CODE § 50-2352 (Supp. 2014). Washington D.C.’s initial statutory
enactment provides an example of the basic nature of early autonomous vehicle legislation.
It states:
An autonomous vehicle may operate on a public roadway; provided, that the
vehicle: (1) Has a manual override feature that allows a driver to assume control
of the autonomous vehicle at any time; (2) Has a driver seated in the control seat of
the vehicle while in operation who is prepared to take control of the autonomous
vehicle at any moment; and (3) Is capable of operating in compliance with the
District’s applicable traffic laws and motor vehicle laws and traffic control
devices.
Id.
71. See FLA. STAT. § 319.145 (2012) (amended 2016).
72. See Autonomous/Self-Driving Vehicles Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES
(Dec.
12,
2016),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-vehicleslegislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/E2QH-DGF7].
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.010 (2016) (interpreting the term “autonomous vehicle”
to exclude a vehicle enabled with a safety or driver assistance system “unless the vehicle is
also enabled with artificial intelligence and technology that allows the vehicle to carry out all
the mechanical operations of driving without the active control or continuous monitoring of
a natural person.”).
77. Id.§ 482A.040.
78. See generally id. §§ 482A.110–.180.
79. See Bose, supra note 26, at 1331.
80. NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.020.
81. D.C. CODE § 50-2351 (Supp. 2014).
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vary in several significant ways, including requirements for licensing,
insurance, and safety features.82
The federal government has also addressed the rise of self-driving
vehicles. In 2013, the Department of Transportation’s National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) released plans for research on
safety-related issues and recommendations to states for testing, licensing,
and regulating automated vehicles.83 Specifically, NHTSA’s statement
addressed (1) an explanation of areas of vehicle innovation and types of
automation that offer potential for reductions in crashes and deaths, (2) a
summary of NHSTA research to help ensure that all safety issues related to
vehicle automation are explored, and (3) recommendations to states that
have authorized operation of self-driving vehicles on how to ensure safe
operation as these new concepts are being tested.84
In early 2016, the NHTSA noted the “rapid development of emerging
automation technologies means that partially and fully automated vehicles
are nearing the point at which widespread deployment is feasible.”85
Subsequently, in September 2016, the Department of Transportation
released its federal policy for automated vehicles.86 A recognized expert on
self-driving vehicle legality suggested the policy’s significance:
[T]his guidance will be the starting point for more thoughtful legislative
discussions—not only at the state level but also, for the first time, at the
federal level. . . . This soft guidance could become even more influential
if states incorporate it in legislation, if [NHTSA] considers it in the course
of exemption or enforcement decisions, or if courts look to it to
understand how a reasonable developer should act.87

The updated federal policy addresses important aspects of self-driving
vehicles, including traffic laws that vary by state88 and gaps in current
regulations for tort liability and insurance.89 According to the policy,
because states are responsible for determining liability and insurance rules,
82. See Bose, supra note 26, at 1331.
83. See generally Policy Statement, Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Preliminary
Statement of Policy Concerning Automated Vehicles (2013).
84. See id. at 2.
85. Policy Statement, Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin, 2016 Update to
“Preliminary Statement of Policy Concerning Automated Vehicles” 1 (2016).
86. See generally NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY: ACCELERATING THE NEXT REVOLUTION IN
ROADWAY SAFETY (2016).
87. Bryant Walker Smith, US Department of Transportation’s Automated Driving
Guidance, CTR. INTERNET & SOC’Y (Sept. 19, 2016, 5:00 PM), http://
cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2016/09/us-department-transportations-automated-drivingguidance [https://perma.cc/M2HP-3Y2X]. Smith also addressed the NHTSA policy’s
enforceability: “The model state policy does not bind states, and some may well decide not
to follow it. The performance guidance likewise does not bind developers of automated
driving systems, but I would expect few of these developers to deviate from it.” Id.
88. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 86, at 25–26. Self-driving
vehicles should be able to follow applicable laws, including “speed limits, traffic control
devices, one-way streets, access restrictions (e.g., crosswalks, bike lanes), U-turns, right-onred situations, metering ramps, and other traffic circumstances and situations.” Id.
89. See id. at 44.
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they should consider how to allocate liability among owners, operators,
passengers, and manufacturers when a crash occurs.90 Additionally, as
these issues involve human lives, the policy warns that laws allocating
liability could have significant effects on consumer acceptance, deployment
rates, and insurance costs.91
Finally, federal policy adopts SAE International’s92 standardized
definitions for degrees of automation, which places self-driving vehicles on
a 0–5 scale.93 Levels 0–2 and 3–5 are distinguished based on whether the
human operator or the automated system is primarily responsible for
monitoring the driving environment, with the term “highly automated
vehicle” representing level 3–5 vehicles.94 Degrees of automation are
relevant in determining the tort duties that individuals who “operate” selfdriving vehicles owe.95
2. Transportation Network Companies
TNCs have disrupted traditional transportation offerings by providing
services through application-based platforms, where customers use
smartphones to request rides.96 The applications function by connecting
customers with nearby drivers using GPS technology.97 Generally, drivers
do not have commercial licenses and drive privately owned vehicles with
personal automobile insurance.98 This arrangement has raised issues for
ride-sharing service regulations, including the extent to which TNCs can be
held liable for claims including unfair competition, breach of contract, and
Specifically, much of the regulatory
drivers’ tortious behavior.99
90. See id. at 45; see also infra Part II.
91. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 86, at 46.
92. SAE International is an association of engineers and technical experts in aerospace,
automotive, and commercial-vehicle industries. See SAE INT’L, http://www.sae.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/5UR6-2E2F]. To simplify communication and facilitate collaboration
within technical and policy domains, the organization issued common terminology for
automated driving. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 86, at 103 n.4.
93. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 86, at 9–10. At level 0,
human drivers perform all driving tasks. Id. At level 1, a vehicle’s automated system
sometimes assists the human driver with some driving tasks. Id. At level 2, a vehicle’s
automated system can conduct some driving tasks, while the human driver monitors the
environment and performs the remaining tasks. Id. At level 3, an automated system may
sometimes conduct parts of the driving task while also monitoring the driving environment,
but the human driver must be ready to take back control when requested by the system. Id.
At level 4, an automated system can conduct the driving task and monitor the driving
environment, and the human need not take back control, but automation can operate only in
certain conditions. Id. Finally, at level 5, the automated system can perform all driving
tasks, under the same conditions as a human driver. Id.
94. Id. at 10.
95. See infra Part II.C.
96. See Emily Dobson, Note, Transportation Network Companies: How Should South
Carolina Adjust Its Regulatory Framework?, 66 S.C. L. REV. 701, 703 (2015) (examining
the insurance coverage Uber provides to consider effective regulatory approaches for TNCs).
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See generally Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Liability and Regulation of RideSharing Services Using Social Media, 6 A.L.R.7th Art. 1 (2015).
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complexity surrounding TNCs involves questions of insurance coverage100
and worker classification.101 Although TNC regulation involves many
concerns, most germane to this Note is insurance coverage.102
The insurance industry supports establishing rules for TNCs to provide
clarity regarding what insurance coverage is provided, when it is provided
(and by whom) as well as disclosures for drivers and passengers.103 Over
forty states have implemented legislation for TNCs.104 California and
Colorado have adopted two of the most detailed statutes to address
TNCs.105 California’s legislature has established specific liability coverage
and disclosure requirements.106 The statute provides different coverage
requirements based on two distinct time periods: (1) when drivers have
accepted ride requests until the rides are complete and (2) when drivers are
logged into the application but are in between rides and have not received
ride requests.107 TNCs are also required to disclose in writing to drivers the
insurance coverage that the company will provide and to “advise a
participating driver . . . that the driver’s personal automobile insurance
policy will not provide coverage because the driver uses a vehicle in
connection with a transportation network company’s online-enabled
application or platform.”108 Additionally, instead of fitting TNCs under
preexisting classifications, California’s legislature created a new category
of commercial carriers to address concerns distinctive to TNCs.109
Similarly, Colorado’s statute establishes specific time periods for TNC
services,110 and it distinguishes between common carriers and TNCs by
exempting the latter from requirements that accompany common
carriers.111
Additionally, TNC regulation often occurs at the municipal level. Some
cities have embraced the operation of TNCs while still demanding that they

100. See, e.g., Dobson, supra note 96.
101. See, e.g., Buckman, supra note 99; Tracey Lien, Lyft Settles Worker
Misclassification Lawsuit for $12.25 Million, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2016, 7:18 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-lyft-settlement-20160126-story.html
[https://perma.cc/E66C-Q9NL].
102. The classification of drivers as either employees or independent contractors is an
important concern for TNC liability. This question is critical in determining whether TNCs
are liable in tort for drivers’ conduct. See Buckman, supra note 99. However, it is outside
this Note’s scope because presumably self-driving vehicles will ultimately render the driver
classification question insignificant.
103. See Transportation Network Companies, PROP. CASUALTY INSURERS ASS’N AM.,
http://www.pciaa.net/industry-issues/transportation-network-companies (last visited Feb. 16,
2017) [https://perma.cc/4RBX-CAUK].
104. See id.
105. See Dobson, supra note 96, at 710 (“Although most states have not enacted as
detailed of statutes for TNC insurance requirements as Colorado and California have, the
insurance concerns are still present.”).
106. See id.
107. See id. at 708; CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5434 (West 2015).
108. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5432(a).
109. See id. § 5440(a).
110. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-10.1-604(3) (2016).
111. See id. § 40-10.1-603.
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meet certain levels of regulation.112 For example, Baton Rouge, Louisiana,
allows “TNCs to operate, free of the licensing, inspections and rate-setting
regulations of the Taxicab Control Board” and does not require specific
insurance coverage.113 The city nonetheless requires that drivers pass
background checks and that vehicles undergo inspections.114 Alternatively,
some cities, like Auburn, Alabama, have imposed burdensome
ordinances.115 The harsh requirements forced Uber to end its operations in
the area because of practical and economic unfeasibility.116 Finally, some
cities have taken a middling regulatory approach, like Chicago, Illinois,
which requires drivers to obtain chauffeurs’ licenses, pass background
checks, and undergo vehicle inspections.117
Although legislators and regulators have begun to confront difficult
questions posed by emerging technologies, law often lags behind new
technology, and self-driving vehicles fit into that narrative.118
Technological advances will ultimately produce vehicles that require no
human intervention,119 and questions of liability among the existing
disparate framework will become increasingly complex: Who—or what—
should be held responsible for mistakes on the road?120 Accordingly, Part
II identifies competing automobile accident tort liability and insurance
regimes to understand the challenges in adapting them to new technological
and societal changes in transportation methods.
II. THE SCENIC ROUTE: A LANDSCAPE OF LIABILITY THEORIES,
VEHICLE STATUTES, AND INSURANCE REGIMES
Existing laws are likely adequate to handle accidents involving the
limited autopilot features already found in some vehicles.121 Normally, an
individual sitting in the driver’s seat has a duty to use reasonable care to
112. See Dobson, supra note 96, at 711.
113. Lehmann, supra note 66, at 9.
114. See id.
115. See Dobson, supra note 96, at 711. The city mandated that TNCs be held to the
same requirements as taxi companies, including the same commercial insurance, city
licensing fees, signage, and background check requirements. Id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See Alex Davies, Self-Driving Cars Are Legal, but Real Rules Would Be Nice,
WIRED (May 15, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/05/self-driving-cars-legalreal-rules-nice/ (explaining the difficulties of regulating self-driving vehicles)
[https://perma.cc/6N6N-9LPQ]; Markoff, supra note 24 (quoting counsel for the California
Department of Motor Vehicles who states, “The technology is ahead of the law in many
areas . . . . If you look at the vehicle code, there are dozens of laws pertaining to the driver
of a vehicle, and they all presume to have a human being operating the vehicle.”).
119. See Mitchell, supra note 37; see also Levine, supra note 38.
120. See, e.g., Alexis C. Madrigal, If a Self-Driving Car Gets in an Accident, Who—or
What—Is Liable?, ATLANTIC (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2014/08/if-a-self-driving-car-gets-in-an-accident-who-is-legally-liable/
375569/ [https://perma.cc/8ZBY-XTRU].
121. See generally Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the
United States, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 411 (2014) (providing a comprehensive analysis of
whether self-driving vehicles can be legally used and sold in the United States).
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avoid accidents, but questions arise about how such a duty may be imposed
on a “driver” unable to intervene in the vehicle’s operation.122 Moreover,
traffic laws assume that automobiles have “drivers,” “owners,” and
“operators.”123 However, the transformative change in the automobile
industry—from limited autopilot to complete automation—may blur the
lines between these statutory terms and make them obsolete.
Automobile accident litigation accounts for two-thirds of all claims,
three-quarters of all lawyers’ fees, and three-quarters of all payouts in the
personal injury liability system.124 Within this system, different regimes
result in a wide variation of how the law treats vehicle owners, operators,
and insurance policyholders when accidents occur. These liability
differences are key to understanding how the materialization of self-driving
vehicles and TNCs present new challenges to traditional conceptions of tort
liability. Part II first explains the suitability of tort law for analyzing the
issues presented and applicable theories of recovery. It then identifies
competing tort and insurance rules for two critically important parties when
crashes occur: vehicle owners and drivers.
A. Why Tort Law?
When an automobile accident occurs, both tort law and criminal law play
important roles.125 As vehicular crashes are one of the most pervasive
causes of injury that society encounters,
the law devotes substantial attention to preventing that bloodshed,
allocating losses, and punishing dangerous drivers. . . . Both [tort and
criminal law] provide a mechanism for sanctioning dangerous drivers and
deterring future crashes. Both can apply to the same event—any given
crash is potentially criminal, tortious, both, or neither. However, tort and
criminal law impose different sanctions according to different
standards.126

Scholars have identified several explanations for why understanding
First, automobiles are
vehicular crashes as tort-like is useful.127
fundamentally hazardous, while simultaneously invaluable.128 Thus, “[t]o
the extent that traffic crashes are seen as inevitable costs of a necessary
activity, tort’s regime of loss allocation is more appropriate than criminal

122. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
123. See infra Part II.C.
124. THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER
LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 103 (2002).
125. See generally Noah M. Kazis, Comment, Tort Concepts in Traffic Crimes, 125 YALE
L.J. 1131 (2016) (identifying how the state has blurred tort and criminal law in the trafficcrime context).
126. Id. Despite clear distinctions between tort and criminal law generally, in the
vehicular accident context “the line between tort and criminal law is blurring, as criminal
law takes on significant features of tort doctrine.” Id. at 1132.
127. See id. at 1146.
128. See id. (citing GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 18–20 (1970)).
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law’s prohibitions.”129 Second, crashes often result from close calls
involving simple bad luck.130 As a result, criminal law’s conceptual focus
on moral culpability is not always appropriate when differences of a few
inches or seconds cause an accident.131 For these reasons, this Note
discusses automobile accidents in the tort law context and tort law’s
application to the emergence of self-driving technology and to limited
vehicle ownership.
1. Fundamental Tort Principles
In automobile accident litigation, the two most common theories of
liability raised by plaintiffs are negligence and strict liability.132 Strict
liability in tort applies fault to the party that caused injury, regardless of
actual fault.133 Generally, strict liability is asserted in claims that implicate
products liability134 or abnormally dangerous activities.135 However, many
courts have moved away from applying absolute strict liability, instead
applying a reasonableness consideration that begins to merge with the
negligence standard.136
Most of tort law is governed by negligence,137 which considers the
reasonableness of a defendant’s actions measured in terms of standards of
care.138 To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must show a
defendant’s failure to exercise the care that a reasonably prudent person
would exercise in like circumstances, expressed in four elements: duty,
breach, causation, and damages.139 However, doctrines fitting within
negligence sometimes allow plaintiffs to prevail without explicitly proving

129. Id.
130. See id. (citing Tom Baker, Liability Insurance, Moral Luck, and Auto Accidents,
9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 165, 167–70 (2008)).
131. See id. (citing Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of
Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1513
n.64 (1974)).
132. See, e.g., Marchant & Lindor, supra note 10, at 1323.
133. See id.
134. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (AM. LAW INST.
1988). For example, manufacturers of defective tools are liable to injured individuals who
show that they were using the product as intended, even if manufacturers were not negligent
in making the tools. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963)
(“To establish the manufacturer’s liability it was sufficient that plaintiff proved that he was
injured while using the [power tool as] it was intended to be used as a result of a defect in
design and manufacture of which plaintiff was not aware that made [it] unsafe for its
intended use.”).
135. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM ch. 4, scope note (AM. LAW INST. 2005).
136. See Marchant & Lindor, supra note 10, at 1323.
137. See Kenneth W. Simons, The Crime/Tort Distinction: Legal Doctrine and
Normative Perspectives, 17 WIDENER L.J. 719, 722 (2008).
138. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 7.
139. See Negligence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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each element.140 Moreover, plaintiffs can attempt to recover not only from
individuals but also from manufacturers, franchisors, trade associations, or
entire industries.141 Thus, broader theories of recovery may be applicable
to seek redress against alleged tortfeasors when tortious conduct includes an
array of participants.142
2. Enterprise Liability Theory
Under enterprise liability theory, individual entities can be held jointly
liable for conduct resulting from participation in a shared enterprise.143 In
other words, separate organizations can be held liable for practices or
actions in which they shared.144 Thus, like other theories in which tortious
conduct can be inferred, enterprise liability is based on the assertion that
courts may determine liability even when plaintiffs are unable to show that
a particular defendant is at fault.145
Enterprise liability theorizes that activities that are foreseeable yet
potentially hazardous should bear the costs they engender.146 Guido
Calabresi—an advocate of the law and economics movement—and other
proponents envisioned enterprise liability as extending beyond traditional
negligence to include the idea of no-fault negligence.147 Accordingly,
enterprise liability would entail “the notion that losses should be borne by
the doer[s], the enterprise, rather than distributed on the basis of fault” that
results from individual negligence.148 Thus, the actual costs of activities
are the injuries that occur as a result, regardless of blame.149
Because the goals of enterprise liability are victim compensation and loss
spreading, Calabresi connected loss distribution to a strict allocation of
resources theory.150 He argued that framing “the problem of accident law
in terms of activities rather than in terms of careless conduct [is] the first
step toward a rational system of resource allocation.”151 Further, “a system
of nonfault enterprise liability . . . that assesses the costs of accidents to

140. Under a theory of res ipsa loquitur, for example, “the mere fact of an accident’s
occurrence raises an inference of negligence that establishes a prima facie case.” Res Ipsa
Loquitur, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
141. See Victoria C. Dawson, Who Is Responsible When You Shop Until You Drop?: An
Impact on the Use of the Aggressive Marketing Schemes of “Black Friday” Through
Enterprise Liability Concepts, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 747, 751–52 (2010).
142. See id.
143. See, e.g., Naomi Sheiner, Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise
Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 974 (1978) (proposing enterprise liability theory as a
solution to the causation problems posed in Diethylstilbestrol (DES) litigation).
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See Dawson, supra note 141, at 785 (citing Guido Calabresi, The Decision for
Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Cost, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713, 716 (1965)).
147. See id. at 766.
148. Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
L.J. 499, 500 (1961).
149. See id. at 505.
150. See Dawson, supra note 141, at 766.
151. Id. at 767 (quoting Calabresi, supra note 146, at 717).
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activities according to their involvement in accidents”152 would be the
appropriate way to achieve “a system of accident liability based on accident
‘involvement’ instead of fault.”153 Thus, enterprise liability could aid
society in determining to what extent it seeks to deter accidents.154
In line with these principles, early enterprise liability scholars focused on
proposals for automobile compensation plans.155 Inspired by the enactment
of workers’ compensation legislation, scholars envisioned related solutions
for automobile accidents.156 However, resistance from special interests—
insurance companies and trial lawyers—forced enterprise liability scholars
to turn to strict products liability.157 Therefore, strict products liability and
no-fault compensation plans are aspects of broader enterprise liability
theory.158
According to enterprise liability theory, personal injury law’s goal should
be to create “a more comprehensive and more adequate means of protection
for all victims of personal injuries . . . without placing too heavy a burden
on enterprise or any other segment of the social group.”159 Today, although
individual negligence still dominates tort law, enterprise-liability-like
remedies have become incorporated legislatively and administratively into
workers’ compensation plans, health care policies, and no-fault automobile
insurance schemes.160
After an automobile crash, several parties are potentially liable in a
victim’s tort lawsuit. A vehicle’s owner and driver are both central to the
issue of tort liability.161

152. Calabresi, supra note 146, at 719.
153. Id. at 743.
154. See Dawson, supra note 141, at 767 (citing Calabresi, supra note 146, at 742–43).
155. See Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Enterprise Liability Reexamined, 75 OR. L.
REV. 467, 471 (1996) (discussing the focus of early enterprise liability theorists). The
authors argued that enterprise liability theory, properly understood, opens up new
possibilities for personal injury law reform. See id. at 469.
156. See id. at 471.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id. (quoting Leon Green, The Individual’s Protection Under Negligence Law:
Risk Sharing, 47 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 775 (1953)).
160. See Dawson, supra note 141, at 784.
161. There exist many other parties with potential tort liability. As a vehicle’s
manufacturer may be entirely responsible for a self-driving vehicle’s functionality, products
liability is a relevant body of tort law. A products liability claim grounded in defective
design may be available against the manufacturer of a self-driving vehicle. See, e.g., Bose,
supra note 26; Kyle Colonna, Note, Autonomous Cars and Tort Liability, 4 CASE W. RES.
J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 81 (2012). A defectively designed product is “one which, at the time
it leaves the seller’s hands, is in a condition not reasonably contemplated by the ultimate
consumer and is unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; that is one whose utility does
not outweigh the danger inherent in its introduction into the stream of commerce.” Voss v.
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 207 (N.Y. 1983) (quoting Robinson v. ReedPrentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 403 N.E.2d 440, 443 (N.Y. 1980)). Accordingly, a
manufacturer may be held strictly liable for injuries that result from a defectively designed
product. See, e.g., Hoover v. New Holland N. Am., 11 N.E.3d 693, 701 (N.Y. 2014)
(“Where a plaintiff is injured as a result of a defectively designed product, the product
manufacturer or others in the chain of distribution may be held strictly liable for those
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B. Vehicle Ownership and Vicarious Liability
Vehicle owners may be held liable in tort, but the definition of what
constitutes an owner for purposes of liability and the reach of that liability
vary by state. Moreover, vehicle ownership liability implicates federal law
and insurance requirements. These variations are significant when
considering the potential ability of TNCs to deploy fleets of self-driving
vehicles; these changes may result in concentrated ownership by
commercial entities while diminishing ownership among private
individuals.
Some states hold vehicle owners vicariously liable for a driver’s
negligence. For example, New York imposes liability against the vehicle’s
owner for the negligence of the vehicle’s permissive users.162 Further, the
applicable statutory definition of “owner” includes “any lessee or bailee of
a motor vehicle or vessel having the exclusive use thereof, under a lease or
otherwise, for a period greater than thirty days.”163 At common law, a
vehicle’s owner was not liable for a permissive user’s negligent
operation.164 Thus, New York’s statute created a cause of action where
none previously existed,165 in the nature of vicarious liability.166 The
statute’s purpose is to ensure access by injured victims to “a financially
responsible insured person against whom to recover for injuries”167 and to
“remove the hardship which the common-law rule visited upon innocent
persons by preventing ‘an owner from escaping liability by saying that his
car was being used without authority, or not in his business.’”168
In addition to holding owners vicariously liable for permissible drivers’
negligence, the New York statute requires that owners acquire adequate
insurance coverage.169 The connection between owners’ vicarious liability
and their accompanying obligation to maintain adequate insurance suggests
a legislative intent to ensure that owners subject to New York law act
responsibly regarding their vehicles.170 New York is not alone in imposing
unlimited vicarious liability on vehicle owners for driver negligence.

injuries.” (citations omitted)). Nonetheless, a thorough discussion of products liability is
beyond this Note’s scope.
162. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388 (McKinney 2011). The statute provides:
Every owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable and
responsible for death or injuries to person or property resulting from negligence in
the use or operation of such vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by
any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of
such owner.
Id.
163. Id. § 128; see also Hassan v. Montuori, 786 N.E.2d 25, 27 (N.Y. 2003).
164. See Morris v. Snappy Car Rental, Inc., 637 N.E.2d 253, 254 (N.Y. 1994).
165. See id. at 255.
166. See Gochee v. Wagner, 178 N.E. 553, 554 (N.Y. 1931).
167. Plath v. Justus, 268 N.E.2d 117, 119 (N.Y. 1971).
168. Mills v. Gabriel, 18 N.Y.S.2d 78, 80 (App. Div. 1940) (quoting Plaumbo v. Ryan,
210 N.Y.S. 225 (App. Div. 1925)).
169. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388(4) (McKinney 2011).
170. See Fried v. Seippel, 599 N.E.2d 651, 655 (N.Y. 1992).
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Similar vicarious liability statutes have been enacted in Maine and Rhode
Island.171
There exists an important constraint on unlimited vicarious liability
statutes. New York’s statute is preempted by federal law through the
Graves Amendment172 to the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transportation Equity Act173 (SAFETEA). Due to Congress’s Commerce
Clause power,174 the Graves Amendment prevents states from holding
rental and leasing companies vicariously liable for injuries resulting from a
vehicle’s negligent operation.175 Accordingly, the Graves Amendment
protects New York lessors and rental companies from vicarious liability.176
The Graves Amendment also preempts other states’ laws.177 For example,
the Eleventh Circuit’s affirmation of the Graves Amendment’s
constitutionality may leave individuals without recourse under Florida law
if injured by the driver of a rented vehicle.178
Florida’s vehicle ownership law is based on a form of vicarious liability
labeled the “dangerous instrumentality doctrine.”179 Historically, courts
applied this doctrine in the master-servant context where a master entrusted
a servant with an instrument that was highly dangerous or could be used in
a high-risk manner.180 In these circumstances, the master could be held
liable for injuries resulting from the servant using the instrument.181 Most
states have held that automobiles are not dangerous instruments under this
common law theory of vicarious liability; Florida is an exception.182
First applied to automobiles in 1920, Florida’s dangerous instrumentality
doctrine imposes strict vicarious liability upon a vehicle’s owner who
voluntarily entrusts that vehicle to an individual whose negligent operation

171. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 1652(1) (2016); 31 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-344(a) (2016); Susan Lorde Martin, Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Graves
Amendment: Implications for the Vicarious Liability of Car Leasing Companies, 18 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 153, 157 (2007) (providing an overview of state vicarious liability law to
understand the constitutional implications of the Graves Amendment).
172. 49 U.S.C. § 30106 (2012).
173. See Green v. Toyota Motor CreditCorp, 605 F. Supp. 2d 430, 433–34 (E.D.N.Y.
2009).
174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. (providing Congress’s power [t]o regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States.”).
175. See Green, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 433–34.
176. See, e.g., Graham v. Dunkley, 852 N.Y.S.2d 169 (App. Div. 2008).
177. See Brent Steinberg, Note, The Graves Amendment: Putting to Death Florida’s
Strict Vicarious Liability Law, 62 FLA. L. REV. 795, 796–97 (2010) (analyzing the effects of
the Graves Amendment on Florida law).
178. See id. at 796 (citing Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 540 F.3d 1242, 1253
(11th Cir. 2008)).
179. See generally Sarah E. Williams, Comment, Florida’s Dangerous Instrumentality
Doctrine, 25 STETSON L. REV. 177 (1995) (describing vicarious liability and the development
of Florida’s dangerous instrumentality doctrine, and suggesting a judicial framework for
automobile accident cases under the doctrine).
180. See id. at 179.
181. See id. at 179–80.
182. See id. at 180.

2017]

CARPOOLING LIABILITY?

1885

causes damage.183 Seventy years after its adoption, the Supreme Court of
Florida reaffirmed the doctrine’s rationale:
The dangerous instrumentality doctrine seeks to provide greater financial
responsibility to pay for the carnage on our roads. It is premised upon the
theory that the one who originates the danger by entrusting the automobile
to another is in the best position to make certain that there will be
adequate resources with which to pay the damages caused by its negligent
operation. If Florida’s traffic problems were sufficient to prompt its
adoption in 1920, there is all the more reason for its application to today’s
high-speed travel upon crowded highways.
The dangerous
instrumentality doctrine is unique to Florida and has been applied with
very few exceptions.184

Using this theory, Florida courts impute negligence from the individual
who actually committed a negligent act (the driver) to a third party with no
role in the act.185 Thus, while Florida’s common law application of the
doctrine to motor vehicles may be unique, it is similar to New York’s
statute because both hold individuals responsible who are not actually at
fault, through strict and vicarious liability. However, Florida’s strict
vicarious liability differs from New York’s because it is not unlimited.186
Instead, Florida relieves owners and lessors of liability if they maintain
specified insurance minimums through a “financial responsibility”
statute.187 Several other states have similar financial responsibility schemes
to limit vicarious liability of owners for driver negligence.188 As in New
York, vehicle ownership liability in Florida and states with similar statutory
schemes becomes relevant in the TNC context because ownership
definitions and the extent of ownership liability are important
considerations in concentrated ownership structures dominated by
commercial entities.
Alternatively, some states specifically eliminate vicarious liability for
owners.189 Iowa’s statute declares that, for leased vehicles, a vehicle’s
lessee is the owner for liability purposes, not the person to whom title has
been issued.190 Similarly, Utah’s statute provides that a vehicle’s “lessee in
possession” is its owner.191 Thus, in these states an individual who has

183. See Aurbach v. Gallina, 753 So. 2d 60, 62 (Fla. 2000) (citing S. Cotton Oil Co. v.
Anderson, 86 So. 629, 637 (Fla. 1920)).
184. Kraemer v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So. 2d 1363, 1365 (Fla. 1990).
185. See Aurbach, 753 So. 2d at 62–63.
186. See Steinberg, supra note 177, at 804.
187. Martin, supra note 171, at 158–59.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 160.
190. See id.; IOWA CODE § 321.493 (2017) (“[I]f the vehicle is leased, ‘owner’ means the
person to whom the vehicle is leased, not the person to whom the certificate of title for the
vehicle has been issued”).
191. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12a-103(8)(b) (West 2016); Martin, supra note 171, at 160.
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leased a vehicle is its owner, and therefore the leasing company, dealership,
or rental company cannot face vicarious liability.192
Other states differentiate between long- and short-term lessors for
liability purposes.193 Nevada provides vicarious liability only for shortterm lessees, provided that the requisite insurance has not been obtained.194
Nevada defines a short-term lessor as one who has leased a vehicle for
thirty-one days or less.195
In sum, the reach of vehicle ownership liability varies by state, as does
the definition of what constitutes a vehicle’s owner for liability purposes.
Moreover, questions of insurance coverage are crucial in determining the
liability of vehicle owners. Finally, federal law critically preempts
vicarious liability in some circumstances. These details are necessary
considerations in determining how to allocate liability as TNCs potentially
use self-driving vehicles to reduce individual ownership.
C. Drivers and Operators
There is no state statutory scheme that expressly requires a vehicle to
have a human driver.196 Nonetheless, state vehicle codes impose
obligations on vehicle drivers and, correspondingly, any person (or
instrument) who drives, operates, or has “actual physical control” of a
vehicle.197 Generally, state statutes broadly define these operative terms.
New York’s statute is representative of an expansive definition of
“driver,” encompassing every “person who operates or drives or is in actual
physical control of a vehicle.”198 Accordingly, any individual sitting at the
steering wheel falls under the definition of “driver” whether or not the
individual is exercising control. Thus, usage of the terms “drives,”
“operates,” or “is in actual physical control of,” includes a wide range of
possible circumstances.199 For example, California courts have deemed
individuals to be “drivers” when (1) exiting the vehicle from the front left
seat,200 (2) failing to engage the parking brake before exiting the vehicle,201
192. Before enactment of the Graves Amendment, New York leasing companies paid
approximately $130 million annually in court judgments because of the state’s unlimited
vicarious liability law. See Steinberg, supra note 177, at 800.
193. See Martin, supra note 171, at 160.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See Smith, supra note 121, at 463 (surveying the vehicle codes of every U.S. state
and finding that “[u]nlike the Geneva Convention, no state statute expressly requires that a
vehicle have a driver”).
197. See id.
198. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 113 (McKinney 2011).
199. See Smith, supra note 121, at 464–74.
200. See Adler v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 279 Cal. Rptr. 28, 30 (Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that the petitioner was a “driver” subject to license suspension when she opened the
door of a parked vehicle into a cyclist’s path and noting that “[t]he statute makes no mention
of whether the vehicle’s engine is on or whether the vehicle is parked, stopped, or in
motion”). The court further declared, “[E]ven a person standing outside the car, trying to
push it into a position so he could start it using another vehicle, was nevertheless ‘engaged in
driving or operating’ that car.” Id.
201. See Panopulos v. Maderis, 303 P.2d 738, 742 (Cal. 1956).
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(3) towing an occupied vehicle,202 and (4) manually pushing an inoperable
vehicle.203 These wide-ranging circumstances suggest that an individual in
“actual physical control of” a vehicle can be the “driver” even if one does
not “drive” it.204 Conversely, an individual who drives a vehicle can be a
“driver” even if she is not in “actual physical control.”205
Some states, like California, differentiate in case law between driving—
which requires motion—and operating—which does not.206 Other states
clearly define the terms differently by statute. In Wisconsin, the legislature
defines “operate” and “drive” separately in the drunk-driving context.207
Whereas “drive” is defined as “the exercise of physical control over the
speed and direction of a motor vehicle while it is in motion,” the word
“operate” means “the physical manipulation or activation of any of the
controls of a motor vehicle necessary to put it in motion.”208 Alternatively,
Illinois does not statutorily distinguish between driving, operating, or being
in physical control of a vehicle.209
Like “driver,” the word “operator” in the automobile context is broadly
defined by courts and legislatures, with the definitions varying by
jurisdiction.210 Courts have broadly construed the term when applying
it to vehicle and traffic laws.211 Some courts have recognized that a
person may operate a vehicle without driving it.212 The Supreme Court
of Massachusetts held that “[a] person operates a motor
vehicle . . . when . . . he intentionally does any act or makes use of any
mechanical or electrical agency which alone or in sequence will set in
motion the motive power of that vehicle.”213 Likewise, New York courts
have explicitly held that “operator” is broader than “driver.”214 Finally,
“actual physical control” can be even broader than operation.215 The
202. See Fairman v. Mors, 130 P.2d 448, 450–51 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942).
203. See Arellano v. Moreno, 109 Cal. Rptr. 421, 425 (Ct. App. 1973).
204. Adler, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 30.
205. Panopulos, 303 P.2d at 742.
206. See Mercer v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 809 P.2d 404, 410 n.6 (Cal. 1991).
207. See Milwaukee County v. Proegler, 291 N.W.2d 608, 613 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
208. WIS. STAT. § 346.63 (2017).
209. See 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-115.8 (West 2016) (“Drive. To drive, operate, or
be in physical control of a motor vehicle.”).
210. Vermont’s statutory definition is the broadest. Smith, supra note 121, at 470–71
(“‘Operate,’ ‘operating,’ or ‘operated’ as applied to motor vehicles shall include ‘drive,’
‘driving,’ and ‘driven’ and shall also include an attempt to operate, and shall be construed to
cover all matters and things connected with the presence and use of motor vehicles on the
highway, whether they be in motion or at rest.” (quoting VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 4(24)
(2013))); see also Marlene A. Attardo, Annotation, What Constitutes “Use” or “Operation”
Within Statute Making Owner of Motor Vehicle Liable for Negligence in Its Use or
Operation, 103 A.L.R.5th 339 (2013).
211. See Smith, supra note 121, at 471.
212. See generally James O. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, What Constitutes Driving,
Operating, or Being in Control of Motor Vehicle for Purposes of Driving While Intoxicated
Statute or Ordinance, 93 A.L.R.3d 7 (1979).
213. Commonwealth v. Uski, 160 N.E. 305, 306 (Mass. 1928).
214. See, e.g., People v. Prescott, 745 N.E.2d 1000, 1004 (N.Y. 2001) (“Our courts have
long recognized that the definition of operation is broader than that of driving . . . .”).
215. See Smith, supra note 121, at 473.
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Supreme Court of Montana was the first state to hold that an individual has
actual physical control of a vehicle if she “‘has existing or present bodily
restraint, directing influence, domination or regulation, of’ it.”216
The three descriptors—“drives,” “operates,” or “is in actual physical
control of”—capture a broad array of possible circumstances that
significantly varies by jurisdiction.217 Therefore, depending on the
situation and jurisdiction, individuals sitting in the driver’s seats of selfdriving vehicles may be considered drivers even if they are not exercising
any control. This has the potential to create unfair results. Thus, these
nuanced discrepancies are important in defining the tort obligations of
vehicle drivers or operators218 and for determining how they should apply
to operators of self-driving vehicles to ensure that inequitable outcomes are
avoided.
D. Duties of Care: Fault-Based Liability
A driver’s actions may constitute civil negligence without reaching the
higher threshold of criminal conduct.219 While a minority of states follow a
no-fault system for insurance purposes,220 most states rely on a
determination of fault when apportioning liability.221 Thus, it is necessary
to identify the relevant duty that a vehicle’s driver owes and the factors to
consider in determining whether that duty has been breached.222
In most jurisdictions, there is an obligation of prudence required of
drivers in lawsuits alleging driver negligence.223 Some states’ codes also
incorporate the concept of “due care.”224 By statute, New York requires
drivers to “exercise due care to avoid colliding with any bicyclist,
pedestrian, or domestic animal upon any roadway.”225 Moreover, New
York drivers have common law duties concerning the safe operation of their
vehicles.226 Specifically,
drivers are under a duty: (1) to maintain a reasonably safe rate of speed;
(2) to have their automobiles under reasonable control; (3) to keep a
proper lookout, under the circumstances then existing, to see and be aware

216. Id. (quoting State v. Ruona, 321 P.2d 615, 618 (Mont. 1958)).
217. See id. at 464–67.
218. See id. at 474.
219. See supra notes 125–31 and accompanying text.
220. See infra Part II.E.
221. See, e.g., Gary Wickert, Commentary: The Failure of No-Fault Insurance, CLAIMS
J. (May 12, 2016), http://www.claimsjournal.com/news/national/2016/05/12/270759.htm
[https://perma.cc/HK97-Z3SY].
222. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (describing negligence principles).
223. See 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 662 (2012); see also Smith, supra note 121, at 487.
224. See Smith, supra note 121, at 488.
225. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1146(a) (McKinney 2011).
226. See 1A COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, ASS’N OF JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE STATE OF N.Y., NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL PJI 2:77 (3d
ed. 2017) (noting drivers have a duty to keep a proper lookout under existing circumstances
to see and be aware of what is in view and to use reasonable care to avoid accidents).
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of what was in their view; and (4) to use reasonable care to avoid an
accident.227

This duty includes a driver’s responsibility to account for dangers from
weather, road, traffic, and other conditions.228 To this end, a driver is
“chargeable with knowledge of what a prudent and vigilant operator would
have seen, and is negligent if he fails to discover a vehicle which, or a
traveler whom, he could have discovered in time to avoid the injury in the
exercise of reasonable care.”229
References in statutes and court holdings to reasonableness, prudence,
practicability, and due care show that while the law accepts a certain level
of risk, it does not specify how to determine that level.230 Thus, the
statutory language and case law imply a relative approach and the need for
context rather than certainty.231 Regardless, this approach requires a fault
determination based on driver conduct, which is understandably relevant
when considering liability solutions for vehicles with no drivers. While
some states impose a fault-based regime, others use a system that limits the
ability of victims to sue alleged negligent drivers.
E. No-Fault Insurance
In the event of an accident, drivers can be liable under traditional
negligence232 or no-fault liability.233 Of course, tort law underpins
automobile usage in all jurisdictions.234 However, vehicle owners are
generally required to have third-party liability insurance or to certify that
they have the means to self-insure.235 As a result, “with insurance
companies and their adjusters being well aware of the applicable ‘rules of
the road’ (relevant motor vehicle tort case law and legislation) in assessing
fault and whether there was a breach of duty and causation which resulted
in damages,” the majority of claims never go to court.236
In a no-fault regime, insurance policyholders are limited in their right to
sue negligent tortfeasors.237 Drivers may not use the court system unless
their injuries reach a specified level.238 If injuries are below the threshold,

227. Hodder v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 2d 335, 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (citations
omitted).
228. See id.
229. Smith, supra note 121, at 492 (quoting Pike Taxi Co. v. Patterson, 63 So. 2d 599,
602 (Ala. 1952)).
230. See id. at 499.
231. See id. at 493.
232. See supra Part II.D.
233. See Bridget Hagan, The Future Is Now: Driverless Cars and the Insurance
Landscape, FINTECH L. REP., May–June 2016, at 8, 9–10. Less commonly, drivers are held
strictly liable for engaging in an ultrahazardous activity that causes injury. See id.
234. See id. at 9.
235. See id.
236. Id. at 10.
237. See Wickert, supra note 221.
238. See Hagan, supra note 233, at 10.

1890

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

victims are compensated by their insurer, rather than the alleged tortfeasor’s
insurer.239
Twelve states and the District of Columbia use a no-fault system.240 No
state has a pure no-fault regime.241 Instead, no-fault states have adopted
modified systems where the right to sue for damages is allowed only after
satisfying statutorily defined monetary, verbal—or a combination of the
two—thresholds.242 New York, Florida, Michigan, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania have verbal thresholds, which use plain language to define
precise injuries, or levels of “serious injury,” that must be met to commence
a lawsuit.243 The definition of serious injury is sometimes established by
statute,244 but it can also be a question of fact that depends on an injury’s
effect on the victim.245 Alternatively, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, North Dakota, Hawaii, and Utah use monetary thresholds,
where a specific dollar amount of medical expenses must be accrued before
a lawsuit may be filed.246
In addition to threshold-related variations among no-fault regimes, other
states employ further modifications. Nine states offer “add-on” no-fault
benefits, where no-fault coverage supplements the conventional tort liability
system and its accompanying insurance coverage.247 Another distinction is
that some states have mandatory add-on benefits, while in other states they
are optional.248 Finally, Kentucky, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania use a
hybrid no-fault system that creates two classes of policyholders by retaining
parts of both pure no-fault and traditional fault-based schemes.249 This
“choice” system allows drivers to choose between limited tort insurance,
which is less expensive and restricts the right to recover, and full insurance,
which allows retention of full rights to recover against third parties but
costs more.250
In sum, there is wide variation among states concerning potential
vicarious liability of vehicle owners, definitions for drivers and operators,
notions of the duty of care, and how automobile insurance fits into accident
liability. These differences matter in determining the suitability of certain
239. See id.
240. See Wickert, supra note 221.
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 5102(d) (McKinney 2016).
245. See Washington v. Baxter, 719 A.2d 733, 740 (Pa. 1998) (holding that the definition
of serious injury depends on (1) the particular body function impaired, (2) the extent of the
impairment, (3) the length of time the impairment lasted, (4) the treatment required to correct
the impairment, and (5) any other relevant factors); see also JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL.,
RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST., THE U.S. EXPERIENCE WITH NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
13 (2010), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG8
60.pdf (noting the wide variation in how courts interpret the definition of serious injury)
[https://perma.cc/6DAP-7PW4].
246. See Wickert, supra note 221.
247. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 245, at 14.
248. See id.
249. See Wickert, supra note 221.
250. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 245, at 15.
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liability aspects for transportation with reduced driver input and limited
ownership.
III. THE PROPOSAL: APPLYING RECOGNIZED TORT PRINCIPLES
TO FUTURE TRANSPORTATION
In applying the liability regimes discussed in Part II to the technological
development identified in Part I, this Note first recognizes previous efforts
to address these complexities. Accordingly, Part III identifies one scholar’s
analysis regarding the relationship between tort law and emerging
technology before shifting to a practical application to self-driving vehicles.
Part III then proposes specific suggestions that apply elements of enterprise
liability to address the changing nature of vehicle ownership and driver
control created by the simultaneous rise of ride-sharing services and selfdriving vehicles.
A. Tort Law and Innovation
Tort law addresses duties of care that individuals and organizations owe.
However, tort law does more than simply attribute blame; it fundamentally
entails cost spreading.251 Thus, the need to identify well-financed
defendants with the ability to relieve victims is an important policy
consideration.252 Despite tort’s settled foundations, there is implicit
uncertainty in how the law applies to emerging technologies.253
This Note is not the first attempt to address legal issues for self-driving
automobiles.254 To expand on the difficulties of these questions, Professor
Kyle Graham has identified several recurring features that demonstrate the
interplay between tort law and new technology.255 This Note implicates
three of his observations.

251. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980) (“No longer is
individual ‘blameworthiness’ the acid test of liability; the principle of equitable lossspreading has joined fault as a factor in distributing the costs of . . . misconduct.”); see also
supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the underlying justifications for enterprise liability theory).
252. See, e.g., Nowak v. Nowak, 394 A.2d 716, 723 (Conn. 1978) (holding that, in a
personal injury action arising from an automobile accident, an unlicensed student driver’s
negligence could not be imputed to the plaintiff-instructor to bar a recovery).
253. See generally Kyle Graham, Of Frightened Horses and Autonomous Vehicles: Tort
Law and Its Assimilation of Innovations, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1241 (2012)
(emphasizing uncertainty in tort law’s application to emerging technology).
254. See infra note 274 and accompanying text.
255. See Graham, supra note 253, at 1242. First, initial lawsuits involving new
technology may be atypical of later cases, yet the rules that materialize from early cases may
persist even as the technology evolves. Id. Second, these cases may be analyzed by
reference to similarities in form between the new innovation and preexisting technology, but
these analogies tend to evolve as time passes. Id. Third, the aspects of a new technology that
involve unreasonable risks may be difficult to identify and then isolate from the innovation’s
beneficial attributes. Id. Fourth, the technology’s early adopters might find more difficulty
prevailing upon a claim than those arising once the technology becomes mainstream. Id.
Fifth, “it may be impossible to predict whether, and for how long, the recurring themes
within tort law and its application that tend to yield a ‘grace’ period for an invention will
prevail over those tendencies with the opposite effect.” Id.
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First, while initial lawsuits relating to an innovation may not resemble
later claims, law arising from early cases endures even as the technology’s
risks evolve.256 The invention of the automobile is a prime example of this
phenomenon.257 Early automobile-related lawsuits barely resemble modern
automobile litigation.258 Rather, early automobile litigation usually
“involved claims that the sight or sound of a motor carriage caused a horse
to take fright, resulting in injury either to the horse’s rider, the occupants of
a carriage or wagon the horse had been towing, or the horse itself.”259
Turn-of-the-century courts understood that automobiles were unlikely to be
a passing fad.260 Thus, theories of negligence per se, nuisance, and strict
liability were rejected.261 However, these cases are significant because
“they produced automobile-friendly rules with staying power.”262
Second, until new technology matures and consumers broadly adopt it,
risk profiles are difficult to predict accurately.263 Thus, courts naturally
gravitate toward form-based analogies.264 For example, nineteenth century
hot-air balloon operators were subject to a strict liability rule for ground
damage.265 This rule was subsequently adopted for airplanes because both
were subject to gravity.266 The harsh strict liability rule for airplanes
persisted even as commercial aviation became safe and common.267
Accordingly, simplistic early analogies may produce rules that might be too
harsh and ultimately require reevaluation.268
Finally, courts often believe that early adopters assume the risk of new
technology.269 Again, the invention of the automobile demonstrates this
“blaming the user” dynamic.270 During the early automobile period, courts
often erroneously blamed speeding for accidents, even when they appeared
to have been caused by obvious mechanical failure, a common occurrence
at the time.271
As a consequence of these patterns, self-driving vehicle litigation may
evolve over time, with early claims resembling contemporary lawsuits
alleging negligent vehicle usage:
[C]laims likely will continue to ascribe fault to the users of autonomous
vehicles, drawing distinctions between “proper” and “improper” use
premised on the slowly accumulating body of knowledge on this topic.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

See id. at 1243.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 1246.
See id. at 1249–50.
See id. at 1250.
Id. at 1248.
See id. at 1252.
See id.
See id. at 1254.
See id. at 1254–55.
See id. at 1255.
See id. at 1256.
See id. at 1260.
Id.
See id. at 1261.
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Some of these claims may lack analogues in current torts practice. For
example, perhaps plaintiffs will attack decisions to utilize autonomous
vehicles in specific areas where experience has shown that they present
relatively significant dangers.272

Courts should thus be mindful of the effect that early cases will have on
subsequent decisions and legislation. Additionally, courts must be careful
not to create overly harsh rules or attempt to analogize the technology to
existing practice, while also understanding the critical role of early
adopters. Professor Graham emphasizes the role of uncertainty in tort law’s
application to emerging technologies. In doing so, he builds upon
scholarship anticipating how courts may perceive products liability issues
arising from self-driving vehicle accidents and the potential change in
liability from driver to manufacturer.273
Numerous experts have discussed this shift, its consequences, and
solutions, as well as other proposals to address legal questions relating to
self-driving vehicles.274 However, this Note argues that these contributions
are incomplete because they do not consider the potentially dominant role
of TNCs and the changing nature of vehicle ownership. Self-driving
vehicle development is not occurring in isolation; rather, it is part of a
broader revolution in transportation. Accordingly, this Note takes into
account that innovation is not a linear progression but involves multiple
emerging technological and societal developments. It further assumes
eventual widespread deployment of fully autonomous self-driving vehicles
to look beyond short-term solutions.
Current tort analogues are
inappropriate for this future transportation paradigm. Thus, this Note
proposes a regime that considers liability issues for vehicle owners and
operators with ubiquitous usage of self-driving vehicles and TNCs.
B. Resolution for the Future
This Note provides a solution to the significant automobile accident
liability questions raised by the combined emergence of TNCs and selfdriving vehicles. As these developments reshape the nature of vehicle
ownership and driver control, an effective proposal considers three
interrelated concerns: (1) optimal societal outcomes that account for the
272. Id. at 1270. Graham cites Professor Gary Marchant who notes that claims may
resemble Brouse v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 373, 374 (N.D. Ohio 1949), which faulted a
pilot for not keeping a proper lookout while using the plane’s autopilot. Graham, supra note
253, at 1269 (citing Marchant & Lindor, supra note 10, at 1325).
273. See generally Marchant & Lindor, supra note 10.
274. See, e.g., id. (proposing legal and policy tools to protect manufacturers from liability,
including an assumption of risk defense, legislatively imposed immunity, or federal
preemption of state tort actions); see also Sophia H. Duffy & Jamie Patrick Hopkins, Sit,
Stay, Drive: The Future of Autonomous Car Liability, 16 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 453
(2013) (proposing the application of strict liability law concerning canine ownership to selfdriving vehicles); Harry Surden & Mary-Anne Williams, Technological Opacity,
Predictability, and Self-Driving Cars, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 121 (2016) (exploring how
autonomous vehicles may challenge certain assumptions in existing legal structures);
Stephen P. Wood et al., The Potential Regulatory Challenges of Increasingly Autonomous
Motor Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1423 (2012).
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costs and benefits of new technology and continued development, (2)
careful application of prevailing liability regimes to new innovation, and (3)
workable solutions for courts and legislatures.
1. Strict and Vicarious Liability
The concurrent rise of ride-sharing and self-driving vehicles has created a
unique convergence of traditional automobile manufacturers, leading
These enterprises
technology corporations, and start-up TNCs.275
simultaneously share some financial and data resources while also
competing for market share and new technological breakthroughs.276
Accordingly, financially responsible organizations that play a significant
role in diminishing vehicle ownership and largely eliminating driver input
should be held appropriately liable for tortious conduct.277 Thus, enterprise
liability doctrine is applicable.
Deterring undesirable behavior and compensating victims justify
enterprise liability doctrine.278 Enterprise liability holds businesses strictly
liable for risks associated with their routine operations; thus, it is associated
with the doctrine of respondeat superior.279 Under respondeat superior,
employers bear the risks of employees’ negligent conduct that may injure
innocent victims within the scope of employment.280 TNCs, and other
potential commercial operators of self-driving vehicles, engage in a
business with known risks. Therefore, these companies should bear the risk
that their self-driven vehicles—whether leased, rented, or otherwise
operated—may cause accidents. Like employer-employee relationships,
these risks are part of normal business operations. Under vehicle codes that
broadly define “operation,” self-driving vehicle operators should be held
liable for their vehicles’ conduct acting within the scope of the vehicle’s
role.281
As enterprise liability is based on involvement in activities, rather than
fault, it forms the theoretical basis for strict liability regimes predominantly
implemented for products liability and inherently dangerous activities.282
However, self-driving is theoretically safer than regular driving,283 which is
already considered a normal, everyday activity. Further, self-driving
vehicles may be implicated in accidents even absent a manufacturing or
design defect. Nonetheless, strict liability is a useful approach for selfdriving vehicles because the “driver” is a computer system incapable of
negligence under traditional common law and statutory formulations of due

275. See supra notes 47–53 and accompanying text.
276. See supra Part.I.B.1–2.
277. See supra Part.II.B (discussing financial responsibility as critical to vicarious
liability for vehicle owners).
278. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
279. See Williams, supra note 179, at 204 n.170.
280. See id.
281. See supra notes 210–16 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 150–60 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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care.284 Thus, it is logical to impute responsibility to a third party that
played no role in the negligent act.285 Moreover, holding enterprises
strictly and vicariously liable eliminates the need to reconcile contradictory
and confusing statutes that attempt to define the obligations of individuals
who operate or exert control over vehicles.286
The strict, vicarious nature of enterprise liability aligns with vehicle
ownership statutes that hold owners vicariously liable for permissive
drivers’ negligence.287 The purpose of these statutes is to force financially
responsible defendants to pay for innocent victims’ injuries;288 the
underlying principle is that an individual who entrusts an automobile to
another has adequate resources to pay damages.289 Accordingly, there is a
robust policy-based rationale applicable to self-driving vehicles when deeppocketed TNCs dominate vehicle ownership, effectively functioning as
ubiquitous leasing or rental companies.290
A strict and vicarious liability regime rooted in enterprise liability
principles is justified because businesses involved in deploying networks of
self-driving vehicles—whether characterized as ride-sharing, automotive, or
technology companies—are situated to spread their losses efficiently.291
This can be achieved by adjusting prices to reflect all costs, including the
liability costs incurred from accidents.292 By spreading losses, these
businesses can adequately bear the burden of their operations.293
Additionally, by adjusting rates, these companies can remain profitable,
thus allowing them to continue to operate and innovate.
2. No-Fault Insurance
Enterprise liability-like insurance regimes have been incorporated into
workers’ compensation, health care policies, and no-fault automobile
plans.294 In the employment context, workers’ compensation systems
provide statutory remedies using a comprehensive scheme for
compensating employees injured by employment-related accidents.295 The
concept of workers’ compensation is premised on the recognition that
discarding tort liability in the employment relationship is desirable.296
Accordingly, workers’ compensation statutes function as social insurance

284. See supra notes 223–29 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 204–16 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 162–71 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 167 and accompanying text; see also supra note 184.
290. See Martin & Ryan, supra note 1 (predicting that TNCs’ self-driving vehicles will
“inundat[e] streets with drone cars”).
291. See Williams, supra note 179, at 204.
292. See id.
293. See id.
294. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
295. See 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers’ Compensation § 1 (2016).
296. See id.
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that shifts the burden of loss from the injured employee to the employer or
industry.297
As workers’ compensation has abolished fault-based liability for
employers, no-fault automobile insurance should become the standard for
self-driving vehicles. In no-fault systems, policyholders are limited in their
right to sue negligent tortfeasors and may only sue when injuries reach
certain thresholds.298
Theoretically, self-driving vehicles will be
demonstrably safer than traditional automobiles.299 As accidents become
uncommon and relatively minor, a system that disposes of the need for
fault-based tort inquires will be appropriate. When severe accidents occur
and injured parties are then able to meet lawsuit thresholds, it is more likely
to implicate considerations outside of fault-based negligence like
manufacturing or design defects.300 Products liability lawsuits will
therefore remain available within the tort system.
Self-driving vehicle insurance should be characterized using no-fault
rules that reflect the difficulties for courts in determining fault. Moreover,
when a vehicle has no pedals, mirrors, or steering wheel, there is no need to
determine the reasonableness, prudence, practicability, or due care in a
driver’s conduct.301 Consequently, determining fault to apportion liability
will become impractical.
Under a vicarious liability system with
corresponding no-fault insurance, TNCs—presumptively the insurance
policyholders—will be best suited to bear an insurance burden that shifts
liability from drivers to vehicles. When a system treats self-driving
vehicles as insurable entities, “[t]he car becomes a separate insurable being
that potentially provides a faster insurance payout to victims while
protecting the owners from frivolous lawsuits.”302
Importantly, lawmakers must address several considerations. As TNCs
continue to grow their business operations, regulations should clarify
vehicle ownership definitions within the context of vicarious liability and
how they apply to renters, lessees, and lessors.303 Likewise, legislatures
need to refine what constitutes vehicle “operators” and the corresponding
Additionally,
tort obligations for level 3–5 automated vehicles.304
lawmakers need to address wide variation in states’ automobile insurance
regimes, as they present potential barriers to transportation development.305
This Note’s solution addresses the three interrelated concerns mentioned
above.306 First, it allows stakeholders to continue to develop self-driving
297. See id.
298. See supra notes 237–39 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
300. See Marchant & Lindor, supra note 10, at 1323–24.
301. See supra notes 230–31 and accompanying text.
302. John Frank Weaver, Robots Are People, Too, SLATE (July 27, 2014, 9:45 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/07/ai_drones_ethics_and_laws_i
f_corporations_are_people_so_are_robots.single.html [https://perma.cc/9HNQ-5L7H].
303. See supra Part II.B.
304. See supra Part II.C.
305. See supra Part II.E.
306. See supra Part III.B.
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technology and transportation networks in ways that benefit society while
reducing costs arising from legal uncertainty. Second, although analogies
are inevitably drawn, concerns relating to harsh early rules and “blaming
the user” dynamics are mitigated because fault determinations take on less
importance, and the insurance system already exists in some jurisdictions.
Third, the solution attempts to create a simplified system that can be applied
by courts and legislatures.
CONCLUSION
As modes of transportation and commuting patterns fundamentally
transform, so too will laws that determine complex liability questions. The
distant future is unavoidably difficult to predict and industry participants
will continue to conceptualize new ideas for transportation. Nonetheless,
this Note envisions the future of self-driving transportation and limited
vehicle ownership.
New forms of transportation create uncertainty in applying tort law’s
negligence standard to vehicle owners’ vicarious liability, vehicle
operators’ duties of care, and corresponding insurance. While courts and
legislators must be wary of the uncertainty in applying existing tort doctrine
to new innovation, a solution lies in enterprise-liability-like theories of
recovery—originally imagined for automobile liability—that incorporate
principles of strict and vicarious liability coupled with no-fault insurance.
This proposal creates a socially optimal outcome that appropriately spreads
losses, compensates victims, establishes expectations, and encourages
future innovation.

